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I. Introduction
EMU macroeconomic institutions have been widely criticised. The ECB lack of
transparency and accountability has been often remarked in the press. Com-
mentators have pointed out that some national interests might have excessive
influence within the ECB Governing Council (Casella 2000a, 2000b; Gruner
1999). Moreover, the ECB stabilisation policy appears to some observers weak
and inconsistent, as if its decision-making procedures were not up to the task
(Favero, Freixas, Persson and Wyplosz 2000a, b). The Stability and Growth
Pact (SGP) reputation appears tarnished and revisions are recurrently sug-
gested.1
Instead of the SGP, Casella (1999) advocates the creation of a market for
tradable deficit permits. In the same vein, Casella (2000a) proposes a reform of
the ECB decision-making rule within the Governing Council. The market solu-
tions approach is presented as an alternative to the “explicit co-ordination re-
quired by the collective decision-making procedure …” (Casella 2000a, p. 9). In
our view, such an approach denies the very essence of the European integra-
tion process, which relies on co-ordination and agreement among the member
states over far more numerous issues than macro-economic policies (Von
Hagen and Mundschenk 2001, p. 1).
                                                          
∗ The authors wish to thank for their comments Alex Cukierman, Anton Muscatelli, Fran-
cesco Farina, Marco Catenaro, Riccardo Rovelli, Roberto Tamborini, the participants at
seminars held at the University of Siena and University of Trento. The authors are par-
ticularly grateful to an anonymous referee for many helpful suggestions. The usual dis-
claimer applies. Financial support from Fondazione Cariplo, C.N.R. (Contratto n.
98.03700ST74) and MURST (1999) is acknowledged.
1 The Economist (2001b, p. 13) is even in favour of scrapping the SGP. Politicians have
begun to float their interest for more flexible arrangements despite routine statements of
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In this paper, we discuss a reform proposal for EMU macroeconomic institu-
tions which rests on the generalised adoption of targets, for both monetary and
fiscal policies, to be integrated by a system of checks and balances. The new
arrangements for fiscal policies should induce EMU countries to internalise the
external effects of their own policies, therefore allowing a partial relaxation of the
SGP limits to national debt policies. As for monetary policy, we propose the
adoption of an inflation target, the assignment of ex-post assessing powers to
the Euro12-group and an internal reform of the ECB. The latter should limit un-
due nationalistic influences within the ECB governing bodies.
The paper is organised as follows. Section II and III discuss the institutional
design for fiscal policies and monetary policy, respectively. Section IV con-
cludes.
II. Reshaping National Fiscal Policies within EMU
To begin with, we recall the key aspects of EU institutional arrangements. The
Maastricht Treaty posits that EU fiscal policies are run nationally, following EU-
wide objectives defined on an yearly base by the Council of Economic and Fi-
nance Ministers in the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPGs) and within
the limits set by the SGP. According to Art. 99 of the Maastrich Treaty, the
Council of Economic and Finance Ministers (Ecofin) approves by majority voting
the adoption of guidelines and recommendations proposed by the European
Commission on matters of deficits, taxation and spending. National fiscal poli-
cies are regularly scrutinised to assess their conformity with the BEPGs. The
supervision task is assigned to the European Commission, which co-operates
with the Economic and Financial Committee and reports to the Ecofin. In 1997
the European Council established what is now known as the Euro12-group. The
latter provides a forum where, in connection to Ecofin meetings, the EMU fi-
nance ministers gather to assess EMU macroeconomic developments. The
Euro12-group has no legislative powers.
The SGP sets an upper limit on national deficits as a proportion of GDP (3%).
Countries are required to submit yearly their Stability and Convergence Pro-
grammes (SCPs) to the European Council. The European Commission evalu-
ates each SCP consistency with the medium-term objective of a budget close to
balance or in surplus. On these matters the Commission reports to Ecofin.
Countries failing to comply with the BEPGs or the SCPs are subject to censor-
ship by the other EU members. Only unjustified breaches of the 3% ceiling set in
the SGP cause the adoption of sanctions towards a country.
Out of this complex arrangements, the SGP has received most of the attention
by commentators as well as academics. The SGP presupposes a link between
fiscal discipline, monetary stability and growth. The economic literature identifies
different channels through which such a relation can work.2
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1. The Pros and Cons of the SGP
Excessive deficits and the accumulation of debt occur because governments
underestimate the future consequences of current deficits (Alesina and Tabellini
1990) and have an incentive to use debt strategically (Persson and Svensson
1989). High levels of debt service force a country to increase its fiscal pressure
over time. To the extent that taxation is distortionary, output losses are incurred.
The ECB might therefore be pressured into accommodating monetary policy
(Artis and Winkler 1998). Beetsma and Uhlig (1999) show that, by acting non-
cooperatively, each union member underestimates the equilibrium debt levels
and the ensuing inflationary pressures. As a consequence, fiscal discretion
within a monetary union will generate larger debt levels than without a union.
If the transmission of fiscal shocks is negative, uncoordinated national fiscal
policies cause an undesirable policy mix (excessive deficits, taxation and inter-
est rate) and raise inflation expectations (Eichengreen and Wyplosz 1998; De-
brun 2000).3
The Fiscal Theory of the Price Level (Woodford 1995, 1998) identifies a third
channel: if both the monetary and fiscal authority stick to inconsistent paths for
their policy instruments, the price level adjusts to ensure that the inter-temporal
government budget constraint is fulfilled. Hence, in a “fiscal dominance” regime,
the monetary authority looses control over the price level. In this framework,
rules such as the SGP are needed to avoid a situation of fiscal dominance.4
Despite the consensus on the need for fiscal constraints, the specific features
of the SGP have been widely criticised.
The adoption of a uniform deficit ceiling does not take into account structural
differences across countries, such as different stocks of outstanding debt or the
asymmetric output effects of national fiscal stimuli. Buti and Sapir (1998) give
operational content to the notion of medium-term deficit objectives that would at
least allow for the correct functioning of the automatic stabilisers. They show
that adherence to the Pact requires very different structural balances across
EMU countries. In defence of the Pact, it might be argued that some asymme-
tries will disappear once debt levels have been harmonised below 60% and
automatic stabilisers are reformed and made more effective where necessary.
However, correcting excessive debt levels in countries like Italy and Belgium will
probably take a long time even if one takes at face value the official stabilisation
plans. Furthermore, it is not obvious that the SGP provides sufficient incentives
to induce a re-organisation of national welfare systems consistent with a flexible
use of fiscal policies.
                                                          
3 Under these circumstances, current deficits are too high for two reasons. On the one
hand, governments are not able to internalise the adverse consequences of their actions
on expectations. On the other hand, non-cooperation with the other national fiscal authori-
ties causes a deficit bias.
4 Leith and Wren-Lewis (2002) investigate the specific features of fiscal constraints de-
signed to ensure price stability in a monetary union. They argue that the SGP ceilings are
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Focusing on the size of the budget deficits, the SGP provides at best limited
discipline for national fiscal policies that do not breach the 3% ceiling. This criti-
cism is based on two arguments. The first is that the Pact does not envisage
adequate incentives to the creation of surpluses during economic expansions
(Bean 1998, CESifo 2002, Canzoneri and Diba 2001). One could argue that the
risk of being forced to implement a procyclical policy in the face of a recession
should induce governments to adopt symmetric fiscal policies. Unfortunately,
adverse electoral incentives − one of the very rationales for the Pact − induce
national governments to underestimate the future consequences of an asym-
metric development of fiscal policy. In the present institutional set-up, the
BEPGs should provide guidance to national fiscal policies within the limits im-
posed by the SGP. Von Hagen and Mundschenk (2001, p. 24) argue that the
BEPGs enforcing mechanism relies only on moral suasion or reputation-
damaging peer pressure. They also point out that the connection between the
typical budgetary cycle and the discussion of national SCPs is at best feeble. As
a result, countries like France and Germany have been able to undertake sig-
nificant tax adjustments without mentioning them in their SCPs. The European
Commission (2000) remarks that quite often the measures taken or planned
within the SCPs are not thoroughly explained, preventing an effective process of
peer review within Ecofin. The above arguments are confirmed by the actual
behaviour of national fiscal policies between 1998 and 2000, when, despite the
good growth record, the progress towards fiscal consolidation was very slow
(CESifo 2002).
The second argument is that the SGP apparently ignores the fiscal distortions
which may occur under a balanced budget rule. Excessive taxation may in fact
arise as a consequence of time-inconsistent as well as beggar-thy-neighbour
policies.5 The issue of time inconsistency is described in Beetsma and Boven-
berg (1998), whose results crucially depend on the order of moves by the wage
setters, the national fiscal authorities and the ECB. In setting the tax rate, the
fiscal authorities foresee that the ECB will accommodate a tax increase. How-
ever, they do not internalise the fact that, being completely anticipated, such a
policy is ineffective. Another strand of literature (Levine and Pearlman 1998)
highlights that unco-ordinated fiscal policies are systematically characterised by
the incentive to relax the fiscal stance, in order to achieve an output expansion
through the appreciation of the real exchange rate.6 This result is typically ob-
tained in a symmetric framework, but it is easily extended to the realistic case of
asymmetries concerning national preferences and the economic structure of
EMU members. The common theme to these two contributions is the implicit
emphasis on the importance of commitment to announced tax/spending levels,
which may well differ across EMU member states.
                                                          
5 Successive interpretations of the Pact provided by the European Commission point at
the excessive fiscal pressure within the Euro area, implicitly confirming the importance of
the issue.
6 This effect is normally described in models that assume a negative transmission of fis-
cal shocks to the foreign demand. Catenaro and Tirelli (2000) demonstrate that the same
incentives exist in case of positive transmission if the fiscal authorities act as Stackelberg
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The issue of how should national fiscal policies be implemented within the
SGP limits has quickly turned into a unco-ordination versus co-ordination de-
bate. In this regard, the main results emerged in the theoretical literature are
easily summarised. Unco-ordinated and fully discretionary fiscal policies are un-
desirable, due to adverse “political” incentives, the missing internalisation of
unfavourable effects on expectations, and spill-overs affecting the economies of
member states. Fully discretionary and co-ordinated policies have ambiguous
effects. On one hand, co-ordination worsens the time inconsistency of fiscal
policy, strengthening the public expenditure bias (Beetsma and Bovenberg
1998). On the other hand, the argument in favour of co-ordination is twofold.
First, co-ordination induces national fiscal authorities to internalise the transmis-
sion effects discussed in Levine and Pearlman (1998). Second, co-ordination of
countercyclical fiscal policies is always desirable, provided that appropriate in-
stitutional design removes the expenditure bias. To this end, Catenaro and
Tirelli (2000) propose the adoption of public spending targets.
Policy-oriented contributions have been characterised by opposing views.
Those who favour unco-ordination claim that governments should run a cycli-
cally-adjusted balanced budget (Alesina, Blanchard, Galì, Giavazzi and Uhlig
2001; CESifo 2002). In contrast with this approach, Von Hagen and Mund-
schenk (2001) argue that fiscal co-ordination is a necessary prerequisite to ob-
tain EMU club-goods such as price stability. The authors criticise the present in-
stitutional set-up, where BEPGs must be unanimously approved by the Euro-
pean Council (Art. 99 of the Maastricht Treaty) but only a subset of EU members
share EMU club-goods. The Commission (2001b) has explicitly recognised the
need for stronger co-ordination within the Euro area, and has put forward a pro-
posal. The latter is based on a stronger role for the Euro12-group, who should
articulate the policy responses to specific shocks. On the other hand the Com-
mission's proposal does not entail any enforcement mechanism and entirely re-
lies on unanimous consensus within the Euro12-group to put pressure on “devi-
ant” members.
2. A Proposal
Our proposal rests on the view that significant externalities arise when na-
tional governments retain full discretion in the setting of tax/expenditures rates.
Thus, there is a presumption that institutional arrangements which limit the dis-
cretionary power of national policymakers enhance efficiency. In particular, we
claim that:
Proposition 1: In addition to deficit ceilings, the endorsement of national
tax/expenditure targets, adequately supported by a system of checks and bal-
ances, will efficiently preserve the EMU-club good of price stability and induce
the internalisation of traditional spill-over effects. Moreover, commitment to fiscal
targets will prove consistent with more flexibility in the enforcement of deficit
ceilings than is currently envisaged in the SGP.
Discussion: EU allocation of powers is based on the subsidiarity principle, ac-
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that cannot be adequately performed by its member states. Hence, we do not
argue that some governing body should interfere with national sovereignty in
fundamental decisions such as the choice of the welfare system by imposing, for
instance, an identical tax level across EMU countries. Institutions should instead
be designed to prevent the manipulation of fiscal stances aimed at achieving
short-term macroeconomic effects.
The centrepiece of our proposal is the adoption of fiscal policy targets. Each
government will be bound to announce a multi-year sequence of target levels for
public spending, taxes and deficit that are mutually consistent. Such targets are
a necessary requisite for policies precommitment, since they are used to ex-post
assess the actual behaviour of the national governments. The flexible imple-
mentation of targets for expenditures, taxation and deficit combines a more ef-
fective control on the expansionary bias of national fiscal stances with the use of
countercyclical policies. Several contributions have emphasised the importance
of fiscal stabilisation policies. Some authors (Canzoneri and Diba 2001; CESifo
2002) propose that the focus of the Pact be shifted from actual to structural defi-
cits. Others (Alesina, Blanchard, Galì, Giavazzi and Uhlig 2001) argue that,
within the SGP limits, countries should commit to stabilise the budget over the
cycle. Both suggestions are open to criticism. On one hand, although commit-
ment to a balanced structural budget rule would provide the appropriate mix of
fiscal discipline and flexibility, defining such a rule in practice may prove difficult
because short run measures of the structural balance are subject to a tremen-
dous uncertainty about the trend level of output.7 On the other hand, the sug-
gestion in Alesina, Blanchard, Galì, Giavazzi and Uhlig (2001) apparently ig-
nores that SGP deficit ceilings would clearly become superfluous if countries
were able to individually commit to a symmetric countercylical fiscal policy rule.
Therefore, instead of defining a constitutional policy rule, we sketch a system of
checks and balances, which should induce national governments to implement a
countercyclical rule.
Expenditure/tax targets have received much less attention than deficit objec-
tives in the EMU institutional set-up. In our view, both deficits and
tax/expenditure targets are important in preserving EMU price stability and
should thus be granted “equal treatment”. This requires that all targets are
credible and hence governments be made accountable for them at the Union
level. There must be absolute transparency over the management of fiscal poli-
cies. Finally, it is necessary to minimise the possibility that “political” conflicts
over the consequences of governments' actions are disguised as “technical”
controversies. To achieve these goals, we propose that: i) national targets be
co-ordinated ex-ante and turned into binding announcements; ii) specific en-
forcement powers be assigned to EMU peers; iii) the surveillance procedure be
strengthened.
Ex-ante targets coordination. Macro-economic efficiency may be attained only
if each country internalises the consequences of its own choices on EMU condi-
tions. This basic principle applies also to the definition of tax/expenditures tar-
gets. For example, the non-cooperative setting of taxation targets might gener-
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ate excessive inflationary pressures.8 In our view, ex-ante co-ordination should
also be concerned with the macroeconomic consequences of foreseeable
structural reforms of the welfare state. It is well known that structural reforms
affect the macroeconomic policy stance and typically require a prolonged ad-
justment period. Such effects cannot be ignored, because of externalities on
other economies. Thus each country should retain the right to undertake struc-
tural reforms at its own choice, but the macroeconomic implications of transition
periods should be matter for ex-ante policy co-ordination9. The Irish transition to
a low-tax regime is a good case in point. Another good case in point is the hot
and somewhat confused debate that followed the EC recommendations to the
Irish government, showing that in this regard EMU policy co-ordination is still in
a flux (Alesina, Blanchard, Galì, Giavazzi and Uhlig 2001).
Binding announcements. Targets credibility requires an institutional set-up
such that announced objectives are not systematically disregarded. On the other
hand, the flexible implementation of targets allows to stabilise the economy. The
literature on the optimal trade-off between credibility and flexibility suggests that
ex-post deviations of actual policies from announced targets should be made
“costly” (Lohmann 1992). This is essentially the spirit of the SGP and we agree
with it. Still, deviations from announced targets can be made costly without giv-
ing up flexibility. This is obtained designing a system of checks and balances
among different institutional levels, whereby governments are induced to inter-
nalise the consequences of their own choices. We turn now to the main ele-
ments in such design.
Enforcement powers. A country willing to deviate from announced fiscal policy
targets should submit a request to proceed to the Union members. The request
will identify the underlying causes and the consequent domestic impact of the
proposed change in policy. Moreover, it will spell out its consistency with the an-
nounced medium-term objectives.
We propose that enforcement powers on specific intra-EMU matters, currently
entrusted to Ecofin, be handed over to the Euro12-group.10 The Euro12-group
will then be called upon to express a binding opinion about (proposed) devia-
                                                          
8 This conclusion can be intuitively demonstrated, by comparing the behaviour of a
country maintaining monetary sovereignty with that of a member of the Union. The first, in
selecting the taxation target, will take into account the impact of a distortionary taxes on
output, and therefore on the consequent inflationary pressures. The second will ignore the
symmetric behaviour of the other members of the Union and will underestimate the infla-
tionary impact of its own choices. As a result, the non-coordinated setting of the taxation
targets in the Union will lead to excessive levels of fiscal pressure. The same conclusion is
drawn by taking into consideration the possibility of increasing production through appre-
ciation of the real exchange that could be attained with a unilateral increase in the public
spending level.
9 This issue was implicitly acknowledged in the Lisbon meeting of the European Coun-
cil, when it was agreed that countries should present a yearly report discussing the inter-
actions between the domestic macroeconomic policy stance and the structural policies.
10 Our proposal is akin to the one put forward in Von Hagen and Mundschenk (2001),
who argue that coordination powers should be handed over to an Economic Policy Coun-
cil: “With an appropriate institutional design, such a council would enhance policy coordi-
nation by developing judgements about policy trade-offs and the distribution of adjustment
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tions from announced targets. Such opinion will be based on EMU-wide macro-
economic implications of the new policy course. As the Irish case clearly shows,
countries are unlikely to implement symmetric policies along the cycle, (e.g.:
they may not reduce taxation during a boom). The Euro12-group should monitor
countries for their compliance with the announced targets in good as well as bad
times. Finally, should a country disregard the Euro12-group opinion, it would be
subject to pecuniary sanctions.11
Since each decision is likely to have significant and asymmetric effects on the
welfare of each member country, hegemonic coalitions might bias Euro12-group
decisions in favour of specific national interests. It is therefore important to
regulate the Euro12-group discretionary power. Hence we propose that any de-
cision should respect an equal treatment principle, i.e. countries experiencing
similar cyclical conditions should be allowed a symmetric adjustment of their fis-
cal stance if they wish so. Decisions should be based on publicly disclosed mo-
tivations concerning the Union-wide effects of national policies and should take
into account the ECB's opinion12 about the inflationary consequences of the
policy change. Finally, the European Commission – whose objective function re-
flects the interests of the Union as such – should be appointed as agenda setter
for the Euro12-group meetings.13
Improved commitment to a broader set of targets allows to introduce new pro-
visions concerning deviations from deficit targets. The crux of the matter obvi-
ously is represented by requests to deviate from the 3% ceiling set in the SGP.
In our view, a country (a group of countries) should be allowed to increase its
deficit beyond the ceiling if: i) this is consistent with a balanced budget in the
medium term; ii) the remaining Euro12-group members agree to implement poli-
cies such that the Union-wide deficit does not exceed the 3% limit. This rests on
the important argument that EMU price stability depends on the global fiscal
stance (Von Hagen and Mundshenk 2001; Casella 1999). Thus, if current rules
allow for a global deficit close to 3% there is no need to sanction countries that
breach the SGP rule provided that EMU peers agree to co-ordinate the global
EMU stance within the SGP limit. As for decisions entailing a breach of the 3%
deficit rule at the Union level, Onorante (2002) shows that empowering the ECB
with the right to choose the excess deficit would entirely remove any spending
bias and leave room for enough fiscal flexibility. This solution may in fact be un-
feasible, as it would cause undue political pressures on the ECB. Bearing in
mind that the enforcement of the SGP ultimately rests in the sole hands of na-
tional governments, i.e. to the extent that transparency sufficiently raises the
                                                          
11 In contrast with the current arrangement (Artis and Winkler 1998; Casella 1999), the
implementation of sanctions should be devoid of any discretion.
12 At the present, the ECB plays a role in the policy coordination process via the Eco-
nomic and Financial Committee (EFC). The latter consists of representatives of national
administrations and central banks, of the European Commission and the ECB itself. The
EFC has an advisory and preparatory role for the European Council meetings. Our pro-
posal strengthens the ECB role in the policymaking process, extending the accountability
mechanism and favouring co-ordination between monetary and fiscal policy.
13 At present, the Euro12-group meetings are chaired by one of the finance ministers of
EMU members. We agree with the European Commission's request (2001b) of granting it
the right to advance economic policy measures and to participate into setting the agenda
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costs of running time-inconsistent fiscal policies, a viable alternative is to require
that the Euro12-group and the ECB issue a public statement arguing the case
for their preferred policy stance, leaving the final decision to a qualified majority
within the Euro12-group.
Surveillance procedure. The Amsterdam Treaty assigns the European Com-
mission the task of monitoring economic developments and policies in member
states. Given our emphasis on a broader set of policy targets, the Commission
surveillance tasks should be extended accordingly. As mentioned above, the
effectiveness of the surveillance procedure is currently impaired by the wide-
spread timing mismatch between the writing of SCPs and the national budget
cycle. The European Commission (2001a) itself has recently put forward some
practical suggestions aimed at improving EU budgetary surveillance. Three are
noteworthy: i) partners must be “pre-informed” in case of important policy meas-
ures; ii) the information content of the SCPs must be improved and standardised
across countries14; iii) the SCPs must be submitted to the competent authorities
in autumn each year. We favour the outright adoption of such proposals.
III. The Monetary Institutions
The following discussion focuses on two key aspects of EMU arrangements
concerning the monetary policy. The first is the ECB status as a goal-
independent Central Bank; the second is the composition of the ECB governing
bodies, where national interests are directly and explicitly represented. We will
argue that in principle such a combination of goal independence and national
representation can adversely affect EMU monetary policies, and probably lies at
the heart of the serious difficulties the ECB met in establishing a reputation vis-
à-vis the financial markets.
1. A Critical Assessment
The Maastricht Treaty assigns to the ECB price stability as its primary objec-
tive. Without prejudice to the primary objective, the ECB is committed also to
support the general economic policies of the Community and to promote the
smooth operations of the payment system. The assignment of lexicographic
preferences to the ECB can be interpreted as a device to enhance efficiency,
transparency and accountability in the conduct of monetary policy. However, the
ECB statute and the Bank's interpretation of it have been subject to sharp criti-
cisms, well summarised in Tabellini (1999). First, being goal-independent rather
than instrument-independent, the ECB enjoys excessive discretion. Second, the
endorsement of a monetary policy strategy based on the two pillars of consumer
price inflation and M3 growth may seriously hamper the effective accountability
of the Bank's actions. Third, the ECB has de facto shown little transparency, re-
                                                          
14 This requires the adoption of standardised statistical procedures across countries
and, more important, the elaboration of appropriate Union-wide indicators (European
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leasing information useful to justify ex-post its operations, but of little avail in as-
sessing ex-ante how it intends to achieve its objectives.15 To improve transpar-
ency, the publication of the minutes of the Board meeting has been often in-
voked (among others, see Begg, De Grauwe, Giavazzi, Uhlig, and Wyplosz
1999; Eijffinger 2001). However, no decision has been taken in this direction,
causing also negative judgements by renowned Central Bank watchers (ABN
AMRO 2001).16
The large degree of independence enjoyed by the ECB Governing Council is
acceptable in principle. In fact, goal-independent central banks – notably the
Fed and in the past the Bundesbank – indeed retain a substantial degree of dis-
cretion. In particular, the Fed has often surprised markets (Mishkin and Posen
1997), and the Bundesbank has repeatedly accommodated substantial devia-
tions of the money supply from the announced objectives (Issing 1997). There is
a fundamental difference, however, between pre-EMU Bundesbank and the Fed
on one hand and the ECB on the other. In fact, EMU political fragmentation im-
pairs an ex-post assessment of the ECB actions. To the contrary, in the US
controlling powers are firmly in the hands of the central bank political principal
(Chang 2001), so as they were in Germany before EMU (Lohmann 1997).
Therefore the current ECB institutional set-up does not fit well with the global ar-
chitecture of EMU macroeconomic institutions, simply because there is a striking
imbalance between its degree of goal independence and the strength of ex-post
control. Furthermore, such imbalance leaves room for a potentially excessive in-
fluence of national interests within the ECB Governing Council. This may hap-
pen as a consequence of the peculiar arrangements characterising the ESCB,
where the NCBs constituting the ESCB are nation-based institutions and their
Governors’ votes in the ECB Governing Council may exert a distorting influ-
ence.17 In case of serious cyclical asymmetries across EMU countries, such an
influence may take place either through prevailing coalitions of national interests
or through paralysing conflicts.18 Both cases would be highly detrimental to the
credibility of the ECB as a European institution (Baldwin, Berglöf, Giavazzi, and
Widgrén 2000).
EMU monetary policy has been subject to several criticisms. According to Galì
(2001), it is simply difficult to interpret it in relation to the ECB self-declared ob-
jectives. The uncertain and ambiguous conduct of monetary policy is seen as
the consequence of internal conflicts. Market analysts seem convinced that de-
cision-making within the Governing Council is unlikely to rely on unanimous
                                                          
15 This criticism is partly attenuated by the recent decision to publish the forecasts.
16 The words of Baldwin, Berglöf, Giavazzi and Widgrén (2000, p. 40) well represent
dissatisfaction with this state of affairs: “The detailed study of EMU reform [concerning the
ECB statute] is difficult at this point because we do not know how the system works
now….”.
17 Thomas Mayer, an economist at Goldman Sachs in Frankfurt, stresses this point by
observing that Mr. Greenspan is a “strong leader who has managed to steer markets’ ex-
pectations skilfully. Mr. Duisenberg is more of a “moderator” of the ECB's 18-strong gov-
erning council…” (The Economist 2001a).
18 According to Eichengreen (1991), the Fed faced troubles of this sort in the years be-
fore the '29 crisis because of an institutional framework very similar (i.e. biased towards an
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consensus, as the ECB insists to be the case (The Economist 1999, 2000). To
the contrary, the Council appears – plausibly – characterised by contrasting
views among its members, due to the structural and cyclical divergences affect-
ing member states. To see that, recall the ECB's official position on the diver-
gence of regional inflation rates. The ECB (1999) insists that monetary policy in
the Eurosystem must be oriented to price stability for the Euro area as a whole,
and that possible phenomena of persistent divergence in the growth rates of
prices require structural policies. Favero, Freixas, Persson and Wyplosz (2000a,
p. 3 and p. 44) have criticised this claim: higher inflation in a region might be ac-
companied by localised real expansions that – without proper stabilising actions
– can favour a “boom and bust” development of asset prices, with possible
negative repercussions over systemic financial stability. Consequently, neglect
for the interregional inflation differentials is interpreted as the attempt to prevent
potential conflicts within the Governing Council. In the present institutional set-
up, such an attempt may be regarded as second-best policy to preserve the
ECB reputation as a European institution, but it is likely to generate inefficien-
cies in the conduct of monetary policy.
2. Independence, Transparency and Accountability for the ECB
The aim of our proposed reform is twofold. We suggest measures to increase
transparency and ex-post accountability in the ECB decision-making proce-
dures. At the same time, we propose to strengthen the ECB insulation from po-
litical influences that do not manifest themselves in the classical forms of ap-
pointment power and ex-post policy assessment. To this end, we identify institu-
tional arrangements such that the ECB governing bodies are made largely im-
mune from nationalistic influences, and NCBs simply act as ECB “local”
branches, providing “privileged” information about the actual state of EMU
regions.
New Jurisdictions for the NCBs. To prevent the over-representation of national
interests within the ECB Governing Council, the NCBs should be turned into re-
gional banks as in the Federal Reserve system, and should be fewer in number
than EMU members.19 This implies that the jurisdictions of the reformed NCBs
should no longer coincide with national borders. Instead they should be rede-
fined so as to reduce structural asymmetries among them20, limiting the risk of a
structural polarisation of the votes within the Governing Council. Moreover, in
light of the foreseeable EMU enlargement, re-design of jurisdictions could pre-
vent the dominance of small countries feared in Baldwin, Berglöf, Giavazzi and
Widgrén (2000).
                                                          
19 In view of the enlargement, Baldwin, Berglöf, Giavazzi and Widgrén (2000) suggest
either weighting NCBs’ voting rights by the country GDP shares or assigning monetary
policy to the Executive Board only. In the following we comment on both these proposals.
20 See Graboyes (1990) for a similar view. It is interesting to observe that the federation
of the local central banks in the US Federal System was preceded by a redefinition of ju-
risdictions which cut across state borders and local economies, so as to limit the risk that
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Our proposal is likely to raise two objections. The first concerns the organisa-
tion of banking policy. In fact, in many countries NCBs have traditionally played
quite an important role for prudential supervision. By statute, the ECB is sup-
posed just to co-ordinate national banking policies and the Maastricht Treaty is
ambiguous about the allocation of powers. Perhaps not surprisingly, the NCBs
Governors opted to retain their powers. However, the ever growing integration of
European financial markets calls instead for the centralisation of banking poli-
cies (Prati and Schinasi, 1997; Begg, De Grauwe, Giavazzi, Uhlig, and Wyplosz
1999; Lossani, Natale and Tirelli 1999; Von Hagen and Mundschenk 2001, Uhlig
2002). Our proposal is likely to meet the stiff opposition of those who fear the
complete integration of national financial markets and see the survival of na-
tional regulators as a prerequisite for the protection of national champions in the
banking sector.21 In our view, this strengthens the case for a re-design of NCBs
jurisdictions. The second objection concerns the legal status of the regional
banks. At the present, the NCBs are the shareholders of the ECB. Each national
bank contributes to the capital of the ECB in proportion to national GDP. Seign-
iorage revenues are apportioned by a system of weighted votes assigned to the
NCBs Governors only. This should change, with all proprietary rights shifted to
EMU national governments. As for seigniorage, its distribution is a matter for
governments to discuss and should be assigned to the Euro12-group.
A new appointment mechanism for NCBs Governors. Following the re-design
of jurisdictions, NCBs turn into regional banks. Thus their Governors should be
selected according to a competence principle. The appointment power should
be entrusted to the ECB Governing Council.22
A rotation rule for the NCBs Governors right to vote. At the present, coalitions
forged by converging national interests can command a majority of votes in the
Governing Council. To remedy it, Baldwin, Berglöf, Giavazzi, and Widgrén
(2000) recommend assigning monetary policy decisions to the Executive Board
exclusively.23 Such proposal postulates that Executive Board members repre-
sent Union-wide rather than national interests. Given the current selection pro-
cedures this may well not be the case.24 Moreover, assigning monetary policy to
a body whose members are entirely appointed by elected governments may
trigger electoral cycles in monetary policy. Following the Federal Reserve ex-
ample, we would retain a role for the Governors of the newly designed NCBs.
Being non-political appointees, they should counteract the effects of shifting po-
                                                          
21 In this regard a good example is provided by the Bank of Italy, who retains the power
to discipline competition in banking sector.
22 In steady state, the ECB Governing Council will be composed by the Executive Board
members and by the Governors of the new regional banks. One could imagine several
transition rules consistent with the steady state.
23 Baldwin, Berglöf, Giavazzi and Widgrén (2000) contemplate also maintaining the pre-
sent arrangement while weighting the NCBs' Governors vote by their country GDP share.
Unfortunately, the weighting cannot prevent a nationalistic bias in policy making. Consider
an asymmetric shock which leaves Union-wide output unchanged but adversely affects
the largest economies in the Union. If the latter contribute for more than half of the Union
GDP, expansionary policies would be adopted, absent any need for them at the Union
level.
24 In support of this view, one has just to mention the controversy over the appointment
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litical majorities in the Union and thus in the composition of the Executive Board,
to prevent a nationalistic bias in monetary policy, However, given their pre-
sumably large number relative to the “political” appointees, we favour the adop-
tion of a rotation-voting rule for the NCBs Governors.25
A staggering of appointments. At present, Executive Board members are as-
signed staggered, even if non-renewable, terms. Instead, a NCBs Governor's
term of office has a minimum length of five years and is renewable. It follows
that members of the Governing Council change in an un-coordinated fashion
and some of them do not leave at all.26 In line with established theoretical results
(Waller and Walsh 1996), we favour the adoption of a proper staggering of ap-
pointments for Executive Board members as well as for NCBs Governors.
A re-design of information flows.  Successful monetary policy depends on
timely and accurate information about the working of an economy. At the pres-
ent, the Governing Council relies on NCBs’ informational inputs in making policy
decisions.27 National interests would loose importance within a reformed ECB.
However, one cannot rule out the case where some local interests might affect
policy decisions. Even in the US Federal System FOMC members receive in-
formation processed only by the Board of Governors staff (Cecchetti 2001). One
might argue that, as long as NCBs can provided better or cheaper information
than the ECB staff, there is a cost in curbing local influences. However, whether
or not such cost is large, is an open question. Thus, following Cecchetti (2001),
we advocate for the ECB more centralisation of information gathering and proc-
essing than there is at the present.
Procedures for ensuring the ex-post accountability of the ECB. The ECB’s
“two-pillar strategy” assigns a prominent role to money growth targets as the first
pillar. This strategy has been widely criticised, either because it is of no practical
relevance, or because it might generate confusion and ambiguity. We take the
view that the ECB should discard the two-pillar strategy in favour of inflation tar-
geting. Following a contractualist approach (Walsh 1995, Persson and Tabellini
1993, Svensson 1997), we suggest that inflation targeting be supported by in-
stitutional arrangements designed to increase the Bank accountability. Given the
relative weakness of the ECB political principals, the endorsement of an inflation
target should per se strengthen ex-post control and help to anchor monetary
policy to EMU-wide objectives. Holding the ECB accountable by means of an in-
flation target requires that some key issues be settled: i) Should the ECB
autonomously select the target, or should it be agreed upon, and with whom? ii)
To whom should the ECB account for the actual implementation of monetary
policy?
                                                          
25 Rotation will naturally have to be implemented at least by the time the new accession
countries will enter EMU. The Nice Treaty (2000) simplified the procedure for changing the
voting system for the ECB governing bodies.
26 One of these is the Governor of the Bank of Italy, whose term length depends on
his/her retiring age.
27 Cecchetti (2001) argues that ECB economic forecasts are based on information ex-
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We propose the following:
  i.  By statute the ECB pursues price stability. We suggest that the ECB
retains the task of defining the medium-term inflation target consistent
with price stability.28
  ii.  As in Tabellini (1999), a political principal should be charged with the
power of assessing the consistency between: a) announced policies and
the ECB constitutional mandate; b) announced policies and their actual
implementation. Following a conflict with the ECB, the political principal
is allowed to adopt a sanctioning procedure. The latter may take the
form of public and motivated censorship of the ECB policies or (possi-
bly) the imposition of fines on the Bank. If the political constituencies of
the European Union and of the EMU coincided, the European Parlia-
ment would be the natural ECB principal. However, only a subset of EU
countries share the EMU club-good of price stability. Thus we propose
that the Euro-12 group takes up the job. Should EU and EMU eventually
overlap, this choice should obviously be reversed.
IV. Conclusions
Our proposal for a revision of EMU institutions leaves two issues open:
•  Do the elements constituting our scheme need a simultaneous imple-
mentation or is it possible to proceed to a “piece-wise” implementation?
•  Would the proposed reform require a formal revision of existing
treaties?
As regards the first issue, the adoption of fiscal targets obviously requires the
contemporaneous design of checks and balances necessary to ensure both
credibility and flexibility in their implementation. For what concerns ECB reform,
stripping down the NCBs of their national character, albeit highly desirable, may
prove too difficult in the short term. In any case, the adoption of an explicit infla-
tion targeting regime coupled with stronger ex-post accountability would be a
first necessary step to curb national influences.
As regards the second issue, it is a delicate matter to establish how much of
our proposal can be implemented within the framework provided by the existing
treaties, perhaps exploiting the procedure of enhanced co-operation. This would
be the case for the new arrangements concerning the adoption of fiscal targets.
                                                          
28 Baldwin, Berglöf, Giavazzi, and Widgrén (2000) suggest that Ecofin be entrusted with
the power of setting the inflation target. This proposal closely resembles institutional ar-
rangements in the UK, where the government sets the year-to-year target in the budget
law. We disagree with them for two reasons. First, by including non-EMU countries Ecofin
cannot be an appropriate political principal for the ECB. Second, this approach leaves
room for the manipulation of the target for short–term purposes. In fact, the credibility of
their proposal would ultimately rest on the political costs of unexpectedly raising the target.
In our proposal, separation of powers supplements the transparency inherent to an infla-
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To the contrary, the new clauses regulating budget deficits and the new ar-
rangements proposed for the ECB would certainly require a formal revision of
the Maastricht Treaty. In any event, our proposal is meant as a sketch rather
than a detailed blueprint for institutional reforms. The investigation of this issue
is left for future research.
Summary
Building on widespread criticisms of current EMU institutional arrangements, we sketch
a reform proposal for EMU macroeconomic institutions. We advocate the adoption of tar-
gets for both monetary and fiscal policies, to be integrated by a system of checks and bal-
ances. As for fiscal policy, expenditures, taxation and deficit targets will strengthen the
governments commitment and, at the same time, facilitate “well-behaved” stabilisation
policies. Turning to monetary policy, inflation targeting, alongside with the assignment of
ex-post assessing powers to the Euro12-group and an internal reform of the ECB, will limit
undue nationalistic influences within the ECB governing bodies.
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